Abstract: Plato's Sophist is puzzling inasmuch as it presents us with seven completely different definitions of sophistry. Though not all seven definitions could be accurate, Plato never explicitly indicates which of the definitions is mistaken. Recently, Kenneth Sayre, Mary Louise Gill, and Noburu Notomi have proposed a clever solution to this puzzle. In this paper I explain why the Sayre-Gill-Notomi solution is mistaken, and suggest a better solution.
2 and answers accompanied by insincere belief. And this means that it can't be that all the definitions are wrong, either. Because, after all, the last one is right.
3 But if the last definition is right and all the rest are wrong, then why does Plato give us all those faulty definitions?
In this paper, I want to consider one influential answer to what we might call "the puzzle of the many definitions", criticize it, and then provide an answer of my own. The answer I am going to criticize appears most clearly in the work of Kenneth Sayre, but there are echoes of it in the work of Mary Louise Gill and Noburu Notomi. It is, I think, a very clever and compelling answer, but, as I will argue, it is mistaken.
I will start with a brief discussion of the way in which Plato goes about constructing the various definitions of sophistry in the dialogue, what has come to be known as "the method of collection and division". Sayre himself captures the nature of this method well. The main idea is that collection involves bringing a number of different things into a unity, by finding some necessary feature that they all have in common. So, for example, we can consider learning (to mathêmatikon), recognition (to gnôriseôs), commerce (to chrêmatistikon), combat (to agônistikon), and hunting (to thêreutikon) together, and when we do this, we see that all of these kinds of activities "take things that are or have come into being,…[taking] possession of some of them with words and actions, and [keeping] other things from being taken possession of" (Soph.
219b5-7). By virtue of this necessary common feature, we can place all of these kinds under the umbrella of a more general kind, namely the category of acquisitive expertise (technê ktêtikê). Collection, so construed, is then supposed to prepare the way for division, the next step in the dialectical process. As Sayre describes the method, kinds are classes of particulars that get divided into sub-classes according to forms (kata eidê, or kata genê) , that is, in such a way that "all the members of a given sub-class are instances of the same general Form" (2007, 214) .
A cursory examination of the Sophist clearly indicates that every one of the seven definitions of sophistry constructed therein is the direct outcome of an application of the method of collection and division, indeed of something approaching the method of dichotomous division, in which every class (other than the classes at the terminal nodes of the relevant tree) is divided into exactly two sub-classes. indeed "the nature of the sophist's art" lies in the "variety of activities" described in those definitions (1999, 81) . The function of the seventh and final definition, then, is to grasp the sophist's art "in its unity," by isolating "the essential point of his art which makes that variety [of activities] possible" (1999, 81) .
It is an interesting corollary of this interpretation, and indeed one on which it strongly depends, that the first five definitions accurately describe five types of sophistry.
As Sayre and Gill see it, the inadequacy of these definitions does not hinge on their falsity, but rather on their contingency, their inability to capture the essence of sophistry. The major difficulty is that the first five definitions cannot in fact capture any kind of sophistry. To see this, we need to delve a little more deeply into the nature of the method of division. As Plato both describes it and illustrates it, the method of division involves cutting classes into exclusive and exhaustive sub-classes. By this, I mean that a proper division of class C into C1 and C2 means (i) that no element of C1 is an element of C2 and no element of C2 is an element of C1 (exclusiveness) and (ii) that every element of C is an element of C1 or an element of C2 (exhaustiveness).
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Every case of division, without exception, satisfies these two requirements. When the Stranger begins his investigation into the nature of sophistry by providing a simple paradigm for the application of the method of collection and division, he starts by collecting a variety of different forms of expertise and dividing the class of expertises into two, one type (productive expertise) that brings something into being that wasn't in being before (Soph. 219b5-6), and one type (acquisitive expertise) that takes possession of things that have already come into being (Soph. 219c5-7). Importantly, the Stranger says (or, at least, implicates) that "every expertise falls under acquisition or production"
(Soph. 219c11-d1)-this satisfies the exhaustiveness requirement, and describes acquisitive expertise as a kind of expertise that does not produce (Soph. 219c4-5)-this satisfies one part of the exclusiveness requirement. general, like vs. unlike, better vs. worse, inside vs. outside, sincere vs. insincere, and so on.
If we take the exclusive nature of division seriously, we recognize immediately that since expertise in general divides into productive expertise and acquisitive expertise, no form of productive expertise is acquisitive and no form of acquisitive expertise is productive. Now it is clear that each of the first five forms of expertise characterized by the first five definitions is acquisitive: the first concerns the acquisition of young men, and the other four concern the acquisition of money. But the form of expertise 8 characterized by the seventh and final definition, which is clearly taken to be the correct definition of sophistry, is productive: it involves the production of copies that are themselves appearances, rather than likenesses (Soph. 266d5-e1). So from the exclusive nature of division, it follows directly that none of the forms of expertise characterized by the first five definitions is a form of genuine sophistry. For example, because the hunting of rich young men is a form of acquisitive expertise, it follows from the fact that no acquisitive expertise is productive that the hunting of rich young men is not a kind of productive expertise, and hence that it is not a kind of sophistry at all.
I would add that it is for a slightly different reason that the form of expertise characterized by the sixth definition cannot be a kind of sophistry either. It is commonly thought that the initial division that leads to the sixth definition is totally independent of the initial division that leads to the first five definitions (as well as the seventh). The
Stranger begins the process of dividing the class of expertises into two classes, productive expertise and acquisitive expertise. He classifies the first five forms of sophistry as types of acquisitive expertise, and the last form of sophistry as a type of productive expertise.
But when it comes to the sixth definition, the Stranger begins, not with the productive/acquisitive dichotomy, but rather with the distinction between separation (diakritikê) and combination 9 (sunkritikê) (Soph. 226c), and ends up defining sophistry as involving the separation of better from worse opinions in the soul, keeping the former and throwing out the later, all by means of elenctic refutation of those who don't know but think they know. The separation/combination distinction is an entirely new principle of division. But it is not, I think, completely independent of the distinction between production and acquisition. Consider combination first. Combination involves bringing 9 things together to form something new: combining threads in spinning the warp produces the warp, combining threads in spinning the woof produces the woof, combining warp and woof by intertwining them produces a garment, and so on. Separation too is a kind of production: to card wool, for example, is to produce a set of fibers that are ready for spinning by removing lumps and dust particles; to cleanse the body is to produce health by removing impurities; to cleanse the soul is to produce knowledge of one's ignorance by separating true beliefs from false beliefs. If I am right about this, then the sixth definition of sophistry, like the seventh, isolates a particular kind of productive expertise.
The difference between them lies in the fact that while cleansing the soul is a kind of production through separation, imitation is a kind of production through combination.
What the imitator does is to combine words in such a way as to produce the appearance of knowing what he is talking about. It is then the exclusiveness of the division between separation and combination that explains why the cleansing of the soul through elenctic refutation is not a kind of sophistry at all.
Even leaving the sixth definition aside, the claims I have made entail that the Sayre-Gill solution to the puzzle of the many definitions just won't work. This solution, recall, starts from the assumption that the first five definitions characterize forms or branches of sophistry, and that the inadequacy of these definitions derives not from the fact that they mischaracterize sophistry, but rather from the fact that they pick out features that are shared by some but not all kinds of sophistry. The point of the seventh and final definition, then, is to bring out the features that are shared by the first five forms of sophistry, and that are therefore essential to sophistry per se. But this can't be. For, as
we have seen, the first five definitions do not characterize forms of sophistry at all: the hunting of rich young men, as it turns out, is not a kind of sophistry; nor is the wholesaling or retailing of one's own or others' knowledge of virtue; nor is the moneymaking branch of expertise in debating. If you collect the expertises isolated by the first five definitions, you will find that they do share one major feature in common. But this feature is not the bringing of something into being that wasn't in being before (such as a likeness or an appearance), but rather the acquisition of something that already exists.
"But look," Sayre, Gill, and Notomi might say, "isn't it just plain as day that the To see what gets collected, it helps to take a closer look at the text. At Soph.
231b10-c1, Theatetus points out that "the sophist has appeared in lots of different ways,"
and at Soph. 231c9-d1, the Stranger asks, "how many different appearances has the sophist presented to us?" Later, the Stranger says that "sophists do seem…to know about the things they engage in controversies about" (Soph. 233c1-2), that "to their students they appear wise about everything…without actually being wise" (Soph. 233c6-8), and that "the sophist has now appeared as having a kind of belief-knowledge about everything" (Soph. 233 c10-12). The point of these passages is to underline the fact that the various accounts of sophistry provided in the first five (indeed, six) definitions appropriately describe the way that sophistry appears to those who witness the various activities in which sophists qua sophists engage. It is clear from these passages that sophistry sometimes appears to be this kind of expertise and sometimes appears to be that kind of expertise, without actually being either kind of expertise. In other words, sophistry appears to be, without being, the hunting of young men; it appears to be, without being, the wholesaling of one's own intellectual wares; it appears to be, without being, the retailing of the intellectual wares of others; and so on. What the Stranger is busy collecting at Soph. 231d-e, then, is not the properties that figure in the first five definitions of sophistry, but rather the appearing to possess these properties. What the Stranger wants to know is why sophistry appears in so many different guises: what is it about the expertise of sophistry that explains why we take sophists to have a number of different forms of expertise, forms of expertise that they do not actually possess? And the answer, of course, is that sophistry is a kind of expertise in the production of appearances: it is because the sophist possesses this kind of expertise that he appears to be, without actually being, knowledgeable about so many different kinds of things.
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Contrary to the Sayre-Gill-Notomi hypothesis, then, there is no relevant difference between the first five definitions of the sophist and the sixth. All six definitions are inadequate, for the same reason, namely that none is even so much as an accurate rendition of a branch or kind of sophistry. Sophistry is no more the hunting of rich young men than it is the cleansing of souls by means of elenctic refutation; it is no more the wholesaling of one's own intellectual wares than it is the retailing of the intellectual wares of others. This is how sophistry appears to those who watch the sophist at work. And the only reason for describing the sixth definition as a capturing of a "sophistry of noble lineage" (Soph. 231b8-9) is that it is in the guise of a noble, eminently Socratic activity that sophistry sometimes appears. My answer to it relies on aspects of the dialogue to which many commentators (including Sayre, Gill, and Notomi) have rightly drawn our attention. The Sophist and
Statesman are known for their applications of the method of collection and division. But this method is not applied in a vacuum. In particular, the method is always preceded by, and also guided by, a conspicuous paradigm. As Sayre rightly notes, Plato uses the term "paradeigma" in the late dialogues in a specifically dialectical sense. A paradigm is a model to be relied on in the use of dialectic. It is supposed to be familiar to the learner, it is supposed to "share with the thing being learned salient features that are essential to the latter's nature," it should be "less significant than the primary topic of inquiry," and (in the case of important things) it should be verbal (2007, (80) (81) .
The Stranger begins his investigation into the nature of sophistry in the Sophist by using a definition of the relatively unimportant but familiar expertise of angling (Soph. 218e ff.) as a paradigm (Soph. 218d9) for the proper definition of sophistry. Importantly, angling is a kind of expertise (a feature that is indeed shared with sophistry, as it is finally defined), but it is also a kind of acquisitive expertise. As is well known, this is the paradigm that guides the Stranger's generation of the first five definitions of sophistry.
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According to the picture I have been painting, though, the definition of angling turns out to be a poor paradigm for the definition of sophistry. The main reason for this, of course, is that sophistry is correctly defined as a form of productive expertise, rather than as a form of acquisitive expertise. As is also well known, the final definition of sophistry is guided by a completely different paradigm, something akin to a children's birthday party magician. Between the end of the sixth division and the beginning of the seventh division, the Stranger describes an individual who claims "that by a single kind of expertise he could know…how to make and do everything…[including] you and me and all the other living things, [and also] the sea and earth and heaven and gods and everything else; and furthermore he makes them each quickly and sells them at a low price" (Soph. 233d-234a). This individual is an illusionist, a magician who, being an "expert at drawing," "produces things that have the same names as real things," and thereby fools "the more mindless young children into thinking that he can actually produce anything he wants to" (Soph. 234b). The magician, then, is a producer, one who produces copies of real things, rather than the real things themselves. And it is this magician who guides the collections and divisions that eventually lead to the final definition of sophistry.
What, then, is the point of starting the dialogue with a number of incorrect definitions? The answer, I think, is that the Stranger is telling Plato's bright eyed Academicians how they should expect the three-stage (not two-stage) method of paradigm-collection-division to work in general, and how the method's failure can lead to success. The three-stage method has this in common with the middle period method of hypothesis. It begins with a hypothesis. The hypothesis is a paradigm, a model that both identifies a very general kind in which the kind to be defined falls and provides an example of how to go about collecting and dividing to define the relevant kind. Like the method of hypothesis, the three-stage method can go wrong. The method of hypothesis goes wrong when mutually contradictory consequences are derived from the initial hypothesis (see Phaedo 101d). The three-stage method goes wrong when the initial paradigm leads to definitions that do not apply to (or isolate) the kind one is seeking to define. 12 The difference between the two methods is that, whereas the failure of the method of hypothesis requires the philosopher to go back to the drawing board and come up with an entirely new hypothesis without any further guidance, it is possible for the failure of the three-stage method to yield dividends. For the faulty definitions that issue from the initial paradigm can help the philosopher identify a better paradigm (as in this case through a collection of appearances), indeed a paradigm that will eventually lead her to the truth. Now it might be argued against this that paradigms are not well suited to play a methodological role akin to the role played by hypotheses in the method of hypothesis.
The reason for this is that while paradigms provide us with some sort of visual and intuitive grasp of the relevant subject matter, the method of hypothesis is logical. 3 Here I agree with Cornford (1935) and Notomi (1999) , as against Cherniss (1944 ), Ryle (1966 ), and Brown (2008 . 4 This interpretation echoes Cornford (1935) . 
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6 For more on this, see Notomi (1999, 64-68) . 7 The importance of the exclusiveness requirement is stressed by Brown (2008) , who uses it to criticize Moravcsik's (1973) view that each definition in the dialogue provides a correct characterization of sophistry.
8 For further discussion of this point, see Brown (2008, 8) .
9 Combination per se is not mentioned in the Sophist, but it does come up explicitly as the counterpart of separation in the Statesman, at 282b.
10 Unlike Sayre, Gill and Notomi notice that what is missing from the first five definitions of sophistry is a feature "that links the appearances together" (Gill 2006, 10) . Here the interpretations of Gill and Notomi definitely point in the right direction. But, like Sayre, Gill and Notomi claim that the failure of the first five definitions stems not from the fact that they mischaracterize sophistry, but that they characterize sophistry by means of features that are only accidentally, rather than essentially, true of it. In this respect, as I have argued, the interpretations of Gill and Notomi point in the wrong direction.
11 Notomi (1999, 67 and 274-275) makes much of the fact that the sixth definition is not mentioned when the Stranger restarts his seventh attempt to define sophistry at 265a (see also Gill (2005, section 4 .2)). As Notomi sees it, the fact that the sixth definition is not 20 mentioned at 265a strongly suggests that Plato thinks of it as different from the first five inasmuch as it presents sophistry under a false guise. But this strikes me as an overreading of 265a. The relevant passage reads as follows:
Stranger: Didn't we begin by dividing expertise into productive and acquisitive?
Theaetetus: Of course.
Stranger: And under the acquisitive part the sophist appeared in hunting, combat, wholesaling, and types of that sort. (Soph. 265a4-9)
The fact that the activities characteristic of the sixth definition do not appear on the Stranger's list here is easily explained by the fact that the Stranger is listing only those definitions of sophistry that fell under the acquisitive part of expertise. Given that the sixth definition falls under the part of expertise that involves separation (and, as I argued above, quite possibly production), it is no surprise that it is not listed at 265a4-9, and no deep interpretive significance should be assigned to its absence.
12 I say "isolate" because the failure of the initial definition of statesmanship in the Statesman derives, I think, from the fact that the initial paradigm of the divine shepherd in the Statesman applies to more than one kind. But this is by the bye.
13 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.
